TSTP Solution File: ITP087^1 by Zipperpin---2.1.9999

View Problem - Process Solution

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : Zipperpin---2.1.9999
% Problem  : ITP087^1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v7.5.0.
% Transfm  : NO INFORMATION
% Format   : NO INFORMATION
% Command  : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/tmp.bVvmoULpGs true

% Computer : n009.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Aug 31 05:22:06 EDT 2023

% Result   : Theorem 43.45s 6.15s
% Output   : Refutation 43.45s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :   15
%            Number of leaves      :   20
% Syntax   : Number of formulae    :   41 (  13 unt;  14 typ;   0 def)
%            Number of atoms       :   89 (  16 equ;   0 cnn)
%            Maximal formula atoms :    9 (   3 avg)
%            Number of connectives :  320 (  21   ~;  29   |;   0   &; 237   @)
%                                         (   0 <=>;  23  =>;   0  <=;   0 <~>)
%            Maximal formula depth :   15 (   7 avg)
%            Number of types       :    5 (   4 usr)
%            Number of type conns  :    7 (   7   >;   0   *;   0   +;   0  <<)
%            Number of symbols     :   13 (  10 usr;   7 con; 0-2 aty)
%                                         (  10  !!;   0  ??;   0 @@+;   0 @@-)
%            Number of variables   :   46 (  10   ^;  36   !;   0   ?;  46   :)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thf(secrecy_KS_type,type,
    secrecy_KS: $tType ).

thf(set_Secrecy_KS_type,type,
    set_Secrecy_KS: $tType ).

thf(secrecy_specID_type,type,
    secrecy_specID: $tType ).

thf(set_Secrecy_specID_type,type,
    set_Secrecy_specID: $tType ).

thf(insert1671894227specID_type,type,
    insert1671894227specID: secrecy_specID > set_Secrecy_specID > set_Secrecy_specID ).

thf(q_type,type,
    q: secrecy_specID ).

thf(member_Secrecy_KS_type,type,
    member_Secrecy_KS: secrecy_KS > set_Secrecy_KS > $o ).

thf(p_type,type,
    p: secrecy_specID ).

thf(specKeysSecrets_type,type,
    specKeysSecrets: secrecy_specID > set_Secrecy_KS ).

thf(correctCompositionKS_type,type,
    correctCompositionKS: secrecy_specID > $o ).

thf(pq_type,type,
    pq: secrecy_specID ).

thf(m_type,type,
    m: secrecy_KS ).

thf(subcomponents_type,type,
    subcomponents: secrecy_specID > set_Secrecy_specID ).

thf(bot_bo1785112429specID_type,type,
    bot_bo1785112429specID: set_Secrecy_specID ).

thf(fact_1_notKSQ,axiom,
    ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ q ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl1,plain,
    ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ q ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_1_notKSQ]) ).

thf(conj_0,conjecture,
    ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ pq ) ) ).

thf(zf_stmt_0,negated_conjecture,
    member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ pq ),
    inference('cnf.neg',[status(esa)],[conj_0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl83,plain,
    member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ pq ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_0]) ).

thf(fact_3_subPQ,axiom,
    ( ( subcomponents @ pq )
    = ( insert1671894227specID @ p @ ( insert1671894227specID @ q @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl3,plain,
    ( ( subcomponents @ pq )
    = ( insert1671894227specID @ p @ ( insert1671894227specID @ q @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_3_subPQ]) ).

thf(fact_7_correctCompositionKS__PQ,axiom,
    ! [PQ: secrecy_specID,P: secrecy_specID,Q: secrecy_specID,Ks: secrecy_KS] :
      ( ( ( subcomponents @ PQ )
        = ( insert1671894227specID @ P @ ( insert1671894227specID @ Q @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) )
     => ( ( correctCompositionKS @ PQ )
       => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Ks @ ( specKeysSecrets @ PQ ) )
         => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Ks @ ( specKeysSecrets @ Q ) )
            | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Ks @ ( specKeysSecrets @ P ) ) ) ) ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl7,plain,
    ( !!
    @ ^ [Y0: secrecy_specID] :
        ( !!
        @ ^ [Y1: secrecy_specID] :
            ( !!
            @ ^ [Y2: secrecy_specID] :
                ( !!
                @ ^ [Y3: secrecy_KS] :
                    ( ( ( subcomponents @ Y0 )
                      = ( insert1671894227specID @ Y1 @ ( insert1671894227specID @ Y2 @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) )
                   => ( ( correctCompositionKS @ Y0 )
                     => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y3 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ Y0 ) )
                       => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y3 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ Y2 ) )
                          | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y3 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ Y1 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_7_correctCompositionKS__PQ]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl107,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID] :
      ( !!
      @ ^ [Y0: secrecy_specID] :
          ( !!
          @ ^ [Y1: secrecy_specID] :
              ( !!
              @ ^ [Y2: secrecy_KS] :
                  ( ( ( subcomponents @ X2 )
                    = ( insert1671894227specID @ Y0 @ ( insert1671894227specID @ Y1 @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) )
                 => ( ( correctCompositionKS @ X2 )
                   => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y2 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X2 ) )
                     => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y2 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ Y1 ) )
                        | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y2 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ Y0 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ),
    inference(lazy_cnf_forall,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl7]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl108,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_specID] :
      ( !!
      @ ^ [Y0: secrecy_specID] :
          ( !!
          @ ^ [Y1: secrecy_KS] :
              ( ( ( subcomponents @ X2 )
                = ( insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ ( insert1671894227specID @ Y0 @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) )
             => ( ( correctCompositionKS @ X2 )
               => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y1 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X2 ) )
                 => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y1 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ Y0 ) )
                    | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y1 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X4 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ),
    inference(lazy_cnf_forall,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl107]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl109,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_specID,X6: secrecy_specID] :
      ( !!
      @ ^ [Y0: secrecy_KS] :
          ( ( ( subcomponents @ X2 )
            = ( insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ ( insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) )
         => ( ( correctCompositionKS @ X2 )
           => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y0 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X2 ) )
             => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y0 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X6 ) )
                | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ Y0 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X4 ) ) ) ) ) ) ),
    inference(lazy_cnf_forall,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl108]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl110,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_specID,X6: secrecy_specID,X8: secrecy_KS] :
      ( ( ( subcomponents @ X2 )
        = ( insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ ( insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) )
     => ( ( correctCompositionKS @ X2 )
       => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X2 ) )
         => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X6 ) )
            | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X4 ) ) ) ) ) ),
    inference(lazy_cnf_forall,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl109]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl111,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_specID,X6: secrecy_specID,X8: secrecy_KS] :
      ( ( ( subcomponents @ X2 )
       != ( insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ ( insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) )
      | ( ( correctCompositionKS @ X2 )
       => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X2 ) )
         => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X6 ) )
            | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X4 ) ) ) ) ) ),
    inference(lazy_cnf_imply,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl110]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl112,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_specID,X6: secrecy_specID,X8: secrecy_KS] :
      ( ( ( subcomponents @ X2 )
       != ( insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ ( insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) )
      | ( ( correctCompositionKS @ X2 )
       => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X2 ) )
         => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X6 ) )
            | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X4 ) ) ) ) ) ),
    inference('simplify nested equalities',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl111]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl113,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_specID,X6: secrecy_specID,X8: secrecy_KS] :
      ( ~ ( correctCompositionKS @ X2 )
      | ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X2 ) )
       => ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X6 ) )
          | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X4 ) ) ) )
      | ( ( subcomponents @ X2 )
       != ( insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ ( insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) ) ),
    inference(lazy_cnf_imply,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl112]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl114,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_specID,X6: secrecy_specID,X8: secrecy_KS] :
      ( ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X2 ) )
      | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X6 ) )
      | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X4 ) )
      | ( ( subcomponents @ X2 )
       != ( insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ ( insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) )
      | ~ ( correctCompositionKS @ X2 ) ),
    inference(lazy_cnf_imply,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl113]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl115,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_specID,X6: secrecy_specID,X8: secrecy_KS] :
      ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X6 ) )
      | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X4 ) )
      | ~ ( correctCompositionKS @ X2 )
      | ( ( subcomponents @ X2 )
       != ( insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ ( insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) )
      | ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X8 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X2 ) ) ),
    inference(lazy_cnf_or,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl114]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl692,plain,
    ! [X0: secrecy_specID,X1: secrecy_KS] :
      ( ( ( subcomponents @ X0 )
       != ( subcomponents @ pq ) )
      | ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X1 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ X0 ) )
      | ~ ( correctCompositionKS @ X0 )
      | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X1 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ p ) )
      | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ X1 @ ( specKeysSecrets @ q ) ) ),
    inference('sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl3,zip_derived_cl115]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl4383,plain,
    ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ q ) )
    | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ p ) )
    | ~ ( correctCompositionKS @ pq )
    | ( ( subcomponents @ pq )
     != ( subcomponents @ pq ) ) ),
    inference('sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl83,zip_derived_cl692]) ).

thf(fact_2_notKSP,axiom,
    ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ p ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl2,plain,
    ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ p ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_2_notKSP]) ).

thf(fact_0_cCompKS,axiom,
    correctCompositionKS @ pq ).

thf(zip_derived_cl0,plain,
    correctCompositionKS @ pq,
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_0_cCompKS]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl4409,plain,
    ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ q ) )
    | ( ( subcomponents @ pq )
     != ( subcomponents @ pq ) ) ),
    inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl4383,zip_derived_cl2,zip_derived_cl0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl4410,plain,
    member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( specKeysSecrets @ q ),
    inference(simplify,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl4409]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl4445,plain,
    $false,
    inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1,zip_derived_cl4410]) ).


%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.12  % Problem  : ITP087^1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v7.5.0.
% 0.07/0.13  % Command  : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/tmp.bVvmoULpGs true
% 0.13/0.34  % Computer : n009.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.34  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.34  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.34  % Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.34  % OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.34  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.13/0.34  % DateTime : Sun Aug 27 10:16:50 EDT 2023
% 0.13/0.34  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.13/0.34  % Running portfolio for 300 s
% 0.13/0.34  % File         : /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.13/0.35  % Number of cores: 8
% 0.13/0.35  % Python version: Python 3.6.8
% 0.13/0.35  % Running in HO mode
% 0.56/0.68  % Total configuration time : 828
% 0.56/0.68  % Estimated wc time : 1656
% 0.56/0.68  % Estimated cpu time (8 cpus) : 207.0
% 0.57/0.73  % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/40_c.s.sh running for 80s
% 0.57/0.75  % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/35_full_unif4.sh running for 80s
% 0.57/0.75  % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/40_c_ic.sh running for 80s
% 0.57/0.75  % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/15_e_short1.sh running for 30s
% 0.57/0.76  % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/40_noforms.sh running for 90s
% 0.57/0.76  % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/20_acsne_simpl.sh running for 40s
% 0.57/0.76  % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/40_b.comb.sh running for 70s
% 0.57/0.76  % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/30_sp5.sh running for 60s
% 0.58/0.83  % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/30_b.l.sh running for 90s
% 6.07/1.38  % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/35_full_unif.sh running for 56s
% 43.45/6.15  % Solved by lams/30_sp5.sh.
% 43.45/6.15  % done 565 iterations in 5.361s
% 43.45/6.15  % SZS status Theorem for '/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p'
% 43.45/6.15  % SZS output start Refutation
% See solution above
% 43.45/6.15  
% 43.45/6.15  
% 43.45/6.15  % Terminating...
% 44.09/6.19  % Runner terminated.
% 44.09/6.21  % Zipperpin 1.5 exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------